In 1999, the debtor entered into a general hedging agreement (“GSA”) in favour of the secured creditor. It has been registered in effect in the Alberta Personal Property Registry. In 2000, the debtor and the lessor entered into a framework lease agreement under which the lessor subsequently leased various vehicles and equipment to the debtor. The lessor registered a declaration of financing under the Personal Property Security Act (Alberta), but refrained from describing the guarantees “by position or nature” and did not provide serial numbers. These failures made the interest in the collateral of the framework lease a compelling interest and prevented the lessor from relying on the “super-priority” given to a security interest in the purchase money, consistent with the Alberta equivalent of Section 33 of the PPSA. Following the tabling of Chapter 11, United took the position that none of the agreements entered into at the four airports in question was a “lease” within the meaning of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Act. Instead, United has sought a ruling that each transaction involves secured financing and that United should have the right to continue using the airport facilities, while only a portion of the promised “rent” is paid. The bankruptcy court found that the agreement at one of the airports was a real lease, but not the other three (including the SFO agreement). The District Court partially set aside these judgments on appeal and decided that the four transactions were actual leases rather than secured financing. United have appealed to the Seventh circuit.